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General models of the evolution of cooperation, altruism and other social behaviours have focused almost
entirely on single traits, whereas it is clear that social traits commonly interact. We develop a general kin-
selection framework for the evolution of social behaviours in multiple dimensions. We show that whenever
there are interactions among social traits new behaviours can emerge that are not predicted by one-
dimensional analyses. For example, a prohibitively costly cooperative trait can ultimately be favoured
owing to initial evolution in other (cheaper) social traits that in turn change the cost–beneﬁt ratio of
the original trait. To understand these behaviours, we use a two-dimensional stability criterion that can
be viewed as an extension of Hamilton’s rule. Our principal example is the social dilemma posed by,
ﬁrst, the construction and, second, the exploitation of a shared public good. We ﬁnd that, contrary to
the separate one-dimensional analyses, evolutionary feedback between the two traits can cause an increase
in the equilibrium level of selﬁsh exploitation with increasing relatedness, while both social (production
plus exploitation) and asocial (neither) strategies can be locally stable. Our results demonstrate the impor-
tance of emergent stability properties of multidimensional social dilemmas, as one-dimensional stability
in all component dimensions can conceal multidimensional instability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
From humans to microbes, social dilemmas (Sachs et al.
2004; Lehmann & Keller 2006; West et al. 2007) interact
and intertwine, with individuals simultaneously con-
structing, defending and exploiting a diverse array of
shared public goods. The most well-known areas of inter-
acting social traits concern investments in cooperation
and in the enforcement of cooperation (via various mech-
anisms, termed punishment, policing or sanctions; Frank
2003; Gardner & West 2004; Fehr & Ga ¨chter 2002). For
example, in many species of eusocial hymenoptera,
worker insects must navigate interacting investment
decisions over whether to forgo direct reproduction
(a potentially altruistic act, yielding reproductive costs
to the actor and beneﬁts to the hive) and whether to
eat the ‘illegal’ eggs of other workers (a policing act, redu-
cing the cost/beneﬁts of worker egg-laying). A number of
theoretical studies predict that policing is favoured under
conditions of low relatedness, acting to maintain
cooperation via enforcement; apparently altruistic traits
become favoured in the presence of policing, as the
alternative selﬁsh actions are associated with punitive
sanctions. As a result, cooperation can even increase
with decreasing relatedness (Frank 1995, 2003;
Wenseleers et al. 2004). Comparative studies of worker
laying and policing in ants, bees and wasps support
these conclusions (Wenseleers & Ratnieks 2006).
Another established ﬁeld of study of multiple social
trait evolution concerns altruism and dispersal. A large
body of theory highlights the dependence of altruism on
levels of dispersal, mediated both by relatedness and
local competition (Hamilton 1970; Taylor 1992; West
et al. 2002; Gardner & West 2006; Platt & Bever 2009).
In return, dispersal can be shaped by levels of altruism,
mediated in particular by habitat saturation (Hamilton &
May 1977; Le Galliard et al. 2003). Theoretical models
allowing for the joint evolution of both altruism and dis-
persal have predicted a range of outcomes, spanning both
positive and negative correlations among the two traits
(Perrin & Lehmann 2001; Le Galliard et al. 2005) and
even the emergence of multicellularity (Pfeiffer &
Bonhoeffer 2003; Hochberg et al. 2008). Finally, the
evolution of discriminatory altruism has also been
approached in a multi-trait context, with conditional
helping behaviours co-evolving with potentially discrimi-
natory markers or ‘tags’ (Axelrod et al. 2004; Jansen &
van Baalen 2006; Rousset & Roze 2007).
Whereas cooperation/enforcement, altruism/dispersal
and altruism/discrimination have received signiﬁcant
attention and generated intriguing results (and further
speciﬁc examples of social trait pairings have been
studied, e.g. cooperation and signalling, Brown &
Johnstone 2001; belligerence and bravery, Lehmann &
Feldman 2008), there has been to our knowledge no
general study of social evolution in multiple dimensions.
Here we treat multidimensional dilemmas as a general
social phenomenon, and ask in the most general terms,
what happens if social evolution occurs in a multi-
dimensional trait space? We present a ﬂexible model
framework for the study of any multidimensional social
dilemma, among relatives or non-relatives.
Our approach is to construct an adaptive dynamics
system (Dieckmann & Law 1996) based on the inclusive
* Author for correspondence (sam.brown@zoo.ox.ac.uk).
Electronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1098/rspb.2009.1480 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2010) 277, 415–422
doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.1480
Published online 14 October 2009
Received 17 August 2009
Accepted 22 September 2009 415 This journal is q 2009 The Royal Societyﬁtness effects of the different traits. With the simplest
possible assumptions (for example, traits determined at
a single locus, linkage equilibrium, weak selection, addi-
tive gene action and small mutation rate) the inclusive
ﬁtness effect provides a measure of allele frequency
change (Rousset & Billiard 2000; Taylor et al. 2007),
and the system can reasonably provide the evolutionary
trajectories of the set of traits under the action of selec-
tion. When these assumptions fail (as is almost always
the case), the dynamical equations become complex and
intractable (see Roze & Rousset 2008; for a multilocus
model of social behaviour that incorporates recombina-
tion) so that our system is put forward as a simple
approximation to actual evolutionary trajectories.
We illustrate our framework with a number of speciﬁc
examples (the production and exploitation of a public
good; the production of multiple public goods; invest-
ment in multiple selﬁsh traits), revealing a number of
surprising results owing to multi-trait feedbacks
(e.g. more selﬁshness at higher relatedness; positive run-
away public goods production at low relatedness;
‘either-or’ bistable interactions among selﬁsh traits at
low relatedness). A general result is that in two-
dimensional models, Hamilton’s classic rule (Hamilton
1964) for selection on each trait separately (appendix A,
equation A 4) requires a further ‘interaction’ condition
(appendix A, equation A 6) to adequately describe the
two-dimensional system dynamics.
2. RESULTS
(a) Production and exploitation
We ﬁrst illustrate our approach using a generic model of
the joint evolution of the production and exploitation of
a public good. For example, humans can share pastures,
simultaneously enhancing them with the addition of ferti-
lizer and exploiting them with the addition of livestock
(the exploitation trait being the focus of the classic
‘tragedy of the commons’ of Hardin 1968). Analogously,
microbes can enhance supplies of accessible extracellular
iron through the secretion of scavenging siderophore
molecules to bind insoluble ferric Fe(III), and then
exploit this newly accessible iron with the expression of
appropriate surface receptors to uptake iron bound to
siderophores (Crosa et al. 2004; Grifﬁn et al. 2004).
Consider two social traits: a cooperative, constructive
trait x that builds a shared public good G at a direct
cost to the actor (e.g. investment in fertilizer or sidero-
phores), and a selﬁsh, exploitative trait y that diminishes
the public good and provides a direct beneﬁt to the reci-
pient (e.g. investment in livestock or siderophore-binding
receptors). By looking at the joint evolution of x and y,w e
consider the simultaneous navigation of a tragedy of the
commons (driven by exploitation, y) and a public goods
or collective action dilemma (driven by contributions, x).
A ﬁtness function of the form W(x0, y0,X, Y) ¼
y0 G(X,Y) 2 C(x0,y0) captures these relationships,
where x0 and y0 are the focal individual’s level of pro-
duction and exploitation of the public good, and X and
Yare the same traits averaged across the focal individual’s
group or neighbourhood. The direct beneﬁts of exploita-
tion are proportional to the density G of the public
good, which in turn depends on the prevailing local
levels of production and exploitation, while C captures
the direct costs of investment in x and y (the assumption
that exploitation is an active, costly process is necessary to
generate intermediate levels of investment in exploitation).
Hamilton’s rule (appendix A, equation A 4) offers a
simple heuristic for understanding when selection would
favour an increase in either trait, based on the inclusive
ﬁtness effects H and K of increases in x and y, respect-
ively. Speciﬁcally, given within-group relatedness R and
no genetic correlation between x and y, the inclusive
ﬁtness effects of an increase in x and in y can be
calculated as:
Hðx; yÞ¼
@W
@x0
þ R
@W
@X
; ð2:1aÞ
and
Kðx; yÞ¼
@W
@y0
þ R
@W
@Y
; ð2:1bÞ
with all derivatives evaluated at x0 ¼ X ¼ x and y0 ¼ Y ¼ y
(inclusive of ﬁtness effects calculated via the neighbour-
modulated ﬁtness technique; see Taylor & Frank
1996; Wenseleers et al. in press; appendix A, equations
A 1–A 2). Hamilton’s rule predicts that, considered as
independent traits (holding other traits invariant), high
relatedness should favour both cooperative production
(high x)a n dr e s t r a i n t( l o wy); conversely, low relatedness
should favour both free-riding (low x) and rapaciousness
(high y), reﬂecting two distinct ways to be a social cheat
(Brown et al. 2002). However, this independence
assumption fails under many realistic scenarios.
Figure 1 illustrates the joint dynamics of public goods
investment x and exploitation y for an explicit form of the
above model, chosen to demonstrate the qualitative
features that can emerge owing to simple ecologically
mediated ﬁtness interactions among social traits.
Figure 1a illustrates two joint equilibria (where the null-
clines intersect), one stable and the other unstable
owing to the strong trait interdependence at this point
(changes in x have too large an impact on the equilibrium
value of y, and vice versa). Condition A 6 in appendix A
formalizes and generalizes this distinction into a threshold
condition for the stability of a social equilibrium in two
dimensions. This condition has the form Hx Ky . Hy Kx
(subscripts denote partial derivatives: Hx ¼ @H/@x, etc.).
Here, Hx and Ky measure the strength of selection on
each trait at equilibrium. In a sense they measure the
restoring force for departures from equilibrium in x and y.
On the other hand the cross-terms Hy and Kx measure the
‘disturbing’ effect of each variable on the equilibrium of
the other. More precisely, the quotient 2Hy/Hx measures
the effect of changes in y on the equilibrium value of x
(x*). For example, if 2Hy/Hx ¼ 2, a small increase in y
will cause an increase in x* of twice the amount. Similarly,
the quotient 2Kx/Ky measures the effect of changes in x
on y*. Condition A6 in appendix A can be interpreted as
requiring that the joint restoring force exceed the joint
disturbing effect. Worked examples are provided in the
supporting online materials.
The existence of the unstable equilibrium in ﬁgure 1a
introduces bistability into the system dynamics. Depending
on the initial conditions of x and y, evolution proceeds
towards either a stable intermediate level of both
production and exploitation, or towards no social
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is implicit in Gardner & West 2004, where the condition for
maintenance of punishment and cooperation is less strict
than the condition for invasion of punishment and
cooperation). This ‘asocial’ boundary outcome is locally
stable, since when a public good is not exploited (y ¼ 0),
there is no beneﬁt to its production, and when there is
no production of the public good (and it is not sufﬁciently
generated by any independent process), there is no reward
for investment in the mechanisms of exploitation.
The more ‘social’ outcome of intermediate x and y is
also locally stable because of the same synergistic
interactions—when x is large, there are signiﬁcant rewards
to positive y, and vice versa. As a consequence of the bi-
stability in ﬁgure 1a (and more generally, whenever any
social equilibrium fails the stability test in condition A6),
there will be regions of parameter space in which a small
change in initial conditions (for example in either sidero-
phore production or reception) can lead to a large
change in the ﬁnal evolutionary outcome—a highly social
endpoint on the one hand, and an asocial one on the other.
Siderophore-mediated social interactions can have
a particularly strong synergy owing to the obligate
co-dependence of siderophore molecules and siderophore
receptors (each are liabilities in the absence of the other—
receptors are a particular liability in the absence of
siderophores, as they then serve only to uptake toxic bac-
teriocins; Crosa et al. 2004). If, however, the public good
is also generated in signiﬁcant quantities by other inde-
pendent forces, then the basin of attraction for the
asocial endpoint can disappear (ﬁgure 1b)—for instance
it may pay to place sheep on a pasture (positive exploita-
tion), even if it has never been fertilized (zero
production).
The stable and unstable evolutionary equilibria given
high relatedness (R ¼ 0.9) are illustrated in ﬁgure 1a by
ﬁlled and open circles, respectively. In ﬁgure 2a we
track these equilibria (x*, y*) as a function of relatedness
R, varied from 0 to 1. As expected from an analysis of the
x trait in isolation, increasing R leads to an increase in the
stable equilibrium x*. However, contrary to the analysis
of y in isolation, increasing R also leads to an increase
in the stable equilibrium level y* of selﬁsh exploitation;
that is, we see maximal selﬁshness at high relatedness.
The reason for this effect is again the synergistic coupling
between x and y—less production at low R means less
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Figure 1. Joint evolution of production (x) and exploitation (y) of a shared public good, G. The generic ﬁtness function W(x0,
y0, X, Y) ¼ y0 G(X, Y) 2 C(x0, y0) is speciﬁed with the public goods function G(X, Y) ¼ (b þ X)/(kY þ a) and the cost func-
tion Cðx0;y0Þ¼kxx2
0   kyy0: We assume that the ecological dynamic of the public good G can be approximated by dG/dt ¼ b þ
X 2 (kY þ a)G, where b and a are the rates of independent public goods production and degradation, respectively, and
k weighs the deleterious impact on G of exploitation. The equilibrium value of G is the formula we have used above. Grey
curves are exploitation nullclines (K ¼ 0, appendix A), revealing y-equilibria as a function of ﬁxed production x. Black
curves are production nullclines (H ¼ 0), x-equilibria as a function of ﬁxed y. All nullclines are convergence stable with the
other variable ﬁxed. Nullcline intersections mark points of joint evolutionary equilibria; ﬁlled circles are convergence stable,
open circles unstable. Parameters: a ¼ 0.6, k ¼ kx ¼ ky ¼ 0.5. (a,c) Low independent public goods production, b ¼ 0.1,
(b,d) high independent production b ¼ 1. (a,b) Relatedness R ¼ 0.9, (c,d) R ¼ 0.7.
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in exploitation. As R decreases from 1, the stable inter-
mediate equilibrium declines, the threshold separating
asocial and social outcomes (dotted lines in ﬁgure 2a)
rises, and the zone of attraction for the asocial outcome
increases. At a critical value of R (near R ¼ 0.75 in
ﬁgure 2a), a catastrophic transition occurs as the attracting
and repelling equilibria merge, and for lower R only the
asocial outcome remains (e.g. ﬁgure 1c). Thus, under con-
ditions of low relatedness we see no selﬁsh behaviour
( y* ¼ 0), as there is no constructive behaviour (x* ¼ 0)
to socially parasitize. If independent sources of public
goods provision are sufﬁciently high (ﬁgure 1b,e . g .t h e
pasture can grow by itself), then the joint-stable selﬁsh
exploitation y* can peak at intermediate or low relatedness
(thus approaching the classical one-dimensional predic-
tion), reﬂecting the weakening of the evolutionary
feedback between x and y (ﬁgures 1d and 2b).
(b) Synergistic and antagonistic interactions
among social traits
In general, one-dimensional social analyses fail whenever
there are ﬁtness interactions among social traits. For
social traits x and y, this is the case whenever the inclusive
ﬁtness effect of one trait is a function of the other (i.e.
Hy = 0o rKx = 0; see appendix A). In this case,
Hamilton’s cost and beneﬁt terms (appendix A, equation
A 3) become co-evolving dynamical variables, and thus
neither of the one-trait Hamilton’s rules (appendix A,
equation A 4) can be properly assessed except in the con-
text of the other. When an increase in one variable leads
to an increase in the inclusive ﬁtness effect of the other,
we say we have evolutionary synergy (Hy and Kx are posi-
tive), and this is seen to be the case in ﬁgure 1. In contrast,
when an increase in one variable leads to a decrease in the
inclusive ﬁtness effect of the other, we say we have
evolutionary interference (Hy and Kx are negative).
Figure 3 provides an illustration of neutral, synergistic
and interference forms of interaction among social traits,
with the example of investment in two separate public
goods. When the two public goods are entirely indepen-
dent in both their costs and beneﬁts (Hy and Kx ¼ 0;
ﬁgure 3a,d), we see that the two-dimensional evolutionary
equilibrium remains stable, and behaves entirely as
expected from separate, one-dimensional treatments (the
ESS level of public goods investment increases with
relatedness). In contrast, when Hy and Kx are non-zero,
more interesting dynamics occur. For instance, consider
a scenario where the beneﬁts of the public goods only
accrue through their synergistic interaction (Hy and Kx .
0); when produced in isolation they confer only further
costs. This scenario is consistent with the extracellular pro-
duction of co-enzymes and is illustrated in ﬁgure 3b,e.A s
for ﬁgure 1, we see that synergistic interactions among
social traits can produce bistability between an asocial
boundary condition (investment in neither trait) and the
mutual production of both traits (in this example, an
unbounded runaway), illustrated in ﬁgure 3b for R ¼ 0.8.
In ﬁgure 3e we then show how this unstable equilibrium
(separating runaway processes to joint-zero or join-maxi-
mal public goods provision) varies with relatedness. At
low relatedness, the positive runaway remains attainable,
but the threshold to entering this runaway becomes
increasingly high as relatedness decreases. Finally, we illus-
trate a case of interference (Hy and Kx , 0; ﬁgure 3c,f ),
where each public good is separately useful yet costly in
combination. The resulting dynamics mirror the following
treatment of interfering selﬁsh traits (ﬁgure 4); however,
here we see that for interfering altruistic traits, the effects
of interference are increasing with relatedness, so that the
bistability (convergence to investment only in x,o ro n l y
in y, with the outcome dependent on initial conditions)
emerges at high relatedness.
Our illustrative models so far have been ‘open’ in that
we have chosen the value of relatedness independent of
underlying demographic processes. Models in which
relatedness emerges from demographic parameters such
as deme size or dispersal rates (Taylor 1992; Rousset
2004; Lion & van Baalen 2008) are ‘closed’, and our
ﬁnal example is of this type. The open approach has
allowed us a measure of ﬂexibility in observing model
behaviour with, for example, variable relatedness, but it
is important to see the analysis at work in a particular
population structure, and our ﬁnal example provides a
discussion of this. While the ‘open model’ approach
sacriﬁces some ecological realism, it gains in terms of
generality—allowing comparisons across diverse demogra-
phies—and in terms of tractability (Taylor & Frank 1996;
(a)( b)
x
*
,
y
*
x
*
,
y
*
RR
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5 low independent production high independent production
Figure 2. Equilibrium production (x*, black) and exploitation (y*, grey) of a shared public good, G, as a function of
relatedness Rx ¼ Ry ¼ R. Solid lines are attractors (equivalent to ﬁlled circles in ﬁgure 1), dotted lines are repellors
(equivalent to open circle in ﬁgure 1). Focal ﬁtness is deﬁned in ﬁgure 1. Except for R, ﬁgure 2a has the parameter
set of ﬁgure 1a,c and ﬁgure 2b has the parameter set of ﬁgure 1b,d.( a) Low independent production and (b) high
independent production.
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approaches are highly complementary, and it remains to
be seen what further insights can be generated via closed
models of multiple social trait evolution under speciﬁc
demographic regimes.
Our ﬁnal worked example presents a two-dimensional
generalization of Frank’s (1994) model of the evolution
of selﬁshness in an inﬁnite island model with demes of
size n and non-overlapping generations (Wright-Fisher
demography). This well-known model traditionally
works directly with ﬁtness, assumed to have the form
Wðx0; XÞ¼ð x0=XÞð1   XÞ, where x0 is focal selﬁshness
and X is average selﬁshness in the focal deme. In our
structured version of this model it is more appropriate
to suppose that behaviour affects only fecundity and let
the population structure determine mortality through off-
spring recruitment. Thus, in a one-trait model, we would
take fecundity F to have the classic form
Fðx0; XÞ¼ð x0=XÞð1   XÞ, with other components of
ﬁtness W determined by the population structure. In
fact, because of the internal symmetry of the island
model, a simple general result (Taylor 1992;P .D .
Taylor, D. Cownden & T. Lillicrap 2009, personal
communication) shows that the inclusive ﬁtness effect
H(x) of the behaviour x is independent of offspring dis-
persal patterns and relatedness, and has the same sign
as the direct effect of focal behaviour on focal fecundity:
HðxÞ 
dF
dx0
¼
@F
@x0
þ
@F
@X
1
n
; ð2:2Þ
the second term providing the focal individual’s share of
the effect of average deme behaviour on focal fecundity.
Although relatedness in this model is not equal to 1/n,
but depends both on deme size n and offspring dispersal
rate d, we see that 1/n, in formula (2.2), plays a role
analogous to relatedness.
In our two-dimensional generalization of this model
(ﬁgure 4), a common resource (e.g. space) is exploited in
different ways for two distinct selﬁsh purposes (e.g. acqui-
sition of food and shelter). The most interesting behaviour
occurs when cross-inhibition is more severe than self-
inhibition (i.e. the social cost of x is more inhibiting to
direct beneﬁts of y than is the cost of y itself, and vice
versa; ﬁgure 4a,c). Under these conditions of maximal
trait interaction (here, interference) we again see the desta-
bilization of equilibria (appendix A, equation A 6) that are
independently stable in each constituent dimension.
However, now the destabilization occurs under
conditions of low relatedness, which in this explicit demo-
graphy can correspond to larger deme sizes. Speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that in very small demes both traits can coexist
at low levels (ﬁgure 4c), but in larger demes one trait dom-
inates (excluding the rival trait), with the possibility of
bistability (e.g. n ¼ 5; ﬁgure 4a). As the importance of
cross-inhibition is reduced (ﬁgure 4b,d), we see greater
equilibrium stability (e.g. n ¼ 5; ﬁgure 4b), yet interference
is still manifested in the maximization of selﬁsh trait y at
intermediate deme sizes (ﬁgure 4d) and intermediate
relatedness (electronic supplementary material, ﬁg. S2).
3. DISCUSSION
Our analysis presents a simple and general framework for
the study of the joint evolution of multiple social traits.
We demonstrate the importance of analysing a complete
set of stability conditions for multidimensional social
dilemmas, as separate stability in each component
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Figure 3. Joint evolution of two cooperative public goods traits (x and y), for neutral (a,d), synergistic (b,e) and interference
(c,f ) interactions among the public goods. Fitness is deﬁned by W(x0, y0, X, Y) ¼ pX þ qY þ sXY2cx
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2 representing
the costs and beneﬁts of investment into two costly public goods traits x and y (with independent social beneﬁts p and q,
and direct costs c and k). The presence of both public goods together can lead to increased (synergy, s . 0) or decreased (inter-
ference, s , 0) rewards. Model presentation mirrors ﬁgures 1 and 2.( a–c) Plot x and y nullclines (black and grey curves) with
stable and unstable intersections marked by ﬁlled and open circles, respectively (for R ¼ 0.8). (d–f ) Plot x and y equilibria
(black and grey curves) with stable and unstable equilibria marked by solid and dotted lines, respectively. (a,d) No public
goods interaction: p ¼ 1, q ¼ 1.1, c ¼ k ¼ 0.1, s ¼ 0. (b,e) Synergistic interaction: p ¼ 21, q ¼ 21.1, c ¼ k ¼ 0.1, s ¼ 0.5.
(c,f ) Interference interaction: p ¼ 1, q ¼ 1.1, c ¼ k ¼ 0.1, s ¼ 20.4.
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Proc. R. Soc. B (2010)dimension can conceal multidimensional instability.
For the case of two interacting traits, we derive a two-
dimensional stability criterion dependent on relatedness
(appendix A, conditions A 6–A 7) that can be viewed as
a multidimensional extension of Hamilton’s rule. We
offer a number of examples to illustrate the general stab-
ility condition. Our general theoretical framework now
raises the vital empirical challenge of understanding the
nature of interactions among multiple social traits.
The synergistic interaction between matching pro-
duction and exploitation traits (ﬁgures 1 and 2) is likely
to be mirrored across many interacting social traits. In
the case of two synergistic productive traits, we can see
an analogous threshold between mutual restraint and
mutual production, illustrating again the potential for
bistable dynamics given multiple social dimensions
(ﬁgure 3b). The bistability between the presence of mul-
tiple social traits and the presence of none is consistent
with the co-inheritance of multiple virulence (exopro-
duct) genes in pathogenicity islands (Hacker & Kaper
2000; Nogueira et al. in press) and the co-regulation of
multiple public goods traits in quorum-sensing bacteria
(Miller & Bassler 2001), highlighting the potential
biomedical relevance of understanding multiple social
trait evolution in bacteria (Brown et al. in press).
Our focal example of the joint evolution of a pro-
duction and exploitation trait could be readily extended
to consider further interacting traits. For instance, invest-
ments in the production and subsequent exploitation of a
shared public good (ﬁgures 1 and 2) are likely to interact
with investment in defence of the public good (in a
microbial setting, investment in allelopathic traits such
as bacteriocins; Brown et al. 2009). When there are
more than two interacting traits, the system and the analy-
sis becomes more complicated. Given a stable asocial
boundary (all traits constrained by selection to zero),
the addition of further social dimensions trivially
diminishes the likelihood that the asocial limit remains
stable (simply as there are more ways to be social).
More subtly, as dimensions are added, the likelihood
that any particular dimension becomes social (i.e. non-
zero) increases, as evolution in an additional dimension
can potentially favour the elaboration of the initially con-
strained focal trait (for instance, in ﬁgure 1b, the focal
dimension x is constrained to zero when y ¼ 0; however,
unilateral elaboration of y from zero subsequently favours
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Figure 4. Joint evolution of two competitive traits (x and y), for high (a, c) and low (b, d) levels of mutual interference in an
island model. We set this model in an inﬁnite island population with demes of size n. Focal fecundity is
F ¼ð x0=XÞð1   k1X   k2YÞþð y0=YÞð1   k3X   k4YÞ k5x2
0   k6y2
0, and the inclusive ﬁtness effects of an increase in x
and y are H(x, y) ¼@F/@x0 þ (@F/@X)(1/n) and K(x, y) ¼ @F/@y0 þ (@F/@Y)(1/n), respectively. Model presentation mirrors
ﬁgure 3.( a,b) x and y nullclines (black and grey curves) with stable and unstable intersections marked by ﬁlled and open circles,
respectively. (c,d) x and y equilibria (black and grey curves), with stable and unstable equilibria marked by solid and dotted
lines, respectively. (a,c) Strong interference: k1 ¼ 0.1, k2 ¼ 0.9, k3 ¼ 0.8, k4 ¼ 0.1, k5 ¼ 0.1, k6 ¼ 0.1. (b,d) Weaker
interference: k1 ¼ 0.7, k2 ¼ 0.7, k3 ¼ 0.3, k4 ¼ 0.3, k5 ¼ 0.1, k6 ¼ 0.3. (a,b) Deme size n is ﬁxed at n ¼ 5.
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Sober & Wilson’s (1998) argument that any mechanism
that leads to the emergence of affordable punishment
will allow the elaboration of a more costly, and therefore
previously constrained, cooperative trait (Sober &
Wilson 1998, p. 144).
Following escape from the asocial boundary, predict-
ing the ultimate system fate becomes more complex
with increasing dimensionality. As the number of traits
increases, the conditions for stability of any equilibrium
become more severe, but the number of equilibrium
points also generally increases. If the costs of large
values of all traits are prohibitive, the dynamical system
will stay bounded and has to go somewhere (converging
to a stable point or cycle, or exhibiting chaotic behaviour)
and the ecological systems that survive today are generally
those that have arrived at a stable convergence. It is likely
that such convergence has often wound up at the bound-
ary on which one or more potential traits have been lost
(although synergistic trait interactions will tend to
favour trait coexistence), so that the interesting question
becomes which behaviours are maintained in a particular
system. In this study we have begun to build a framework
in which this question might be studied.
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APPENDIX A. GENERAL METHODOLOGY
Let W(x0,y 0,X ,Y ) be the ﬁtness of an individual (x0,y 0,)
in a neighbourhood (X, Y). Then the inclusive ﬁtness
effects of an x-increase and of a y-increase have the form:
Hðx; yÞ¼RxBxðx; yÞ Cxðx; yÞ; ðA1Þ
and
Kðx; yÞ¼RyByðx; yÞ Cyðx; yÞ; ðA2Þ
where
Cx ¼ 
@W
@x0
Bx ¼
@W
@X
Cy ¼ 
@W
@y0
By ¼
@W
@Y
;
ðA3Þ
all derivatives evaluated at x0 ¼ X ¼ x, and y0 ¼ Y ¼ y
(Taylor & Frank 1996). The notation is chosen because,
in models of cooperative behaviour, C and B can be
regarded as a cost and a beneﬁt. We allow the possibility
that the x- and y-relatedness are different. For example,
if x is a cooperative and y a selﬁsh trait, the x-neighbour-
hood might be smaller than the y-neighbourhood. If
H(x, y) (or K(x, y)) is positive, selection will favour
higher values of x (or y). We write this as
RxBxðx;yÞ . Cxðx;yÞ
RyByðx;yÞ . Cyðx;yÞ
; ðA4Þ
and we obtain the form of Hamilton’s (1964) classical
rule for each trait separately. There is an assumption
here of independence in x and y; that is, no genetic corre-
lation between them (individuals with high or low values
of one trait are neither more nor less likely to carry high or
low values of the other). Given this assumption, the con-
dition for a point (x*, y*)t ob ea nevolutionary equilibrium
is that H(x, y) and K(x, y) be zero.
We now turn to the question of the stability of such an
equilibrium: what will happen to small departures from
(x*, y*)? The classical condition of convergence stability
(Christiansen 1991) is that Hx , 0 and Ky , 0a t
(x*, y*), where the subscript denotes partial derivative.
In this case, both x and y will be separately stable with
the other variable held ﬁxed; that is, if the population-
wide values of x or y depart from equilibrium, selection
will favour those values closer to the equilibrium.
To account for the joint effect of departures in both
traits, we consider the dynamical system
dx
dt
¼ Hðx;yÞ
dy
dt
¼ Kðx;yÞ; ðA5Þ
modelled after the standard adaptive dynamics (Leimar
in press). Note that a stationary point of the system
(H ¼ K ¼ 0) will be a point of evolutionary equilibrium.
For such a point to be dynamically stable (Otto & Day
2007), we ﬁrst require that Hx , 0 and Ky , 0,
and these are the conditions (above) of separate conver-
gence stability, but we also require the additional
condition Hx Ky . Hy Kx that the linearized system have
positive determinant. If this fails, departures from equili-
brium in one variable can destabilize the other. This
condition can be written
aRxRy þ bxRx þ byRy þ c . 0; ðA6Þ
where
a ¼ BxxByy   BxyByx;
bx ¼ BxyCyx   BxxCyy;
by ¼ ByxCxy   ByyCxx;
c ¼ CxxCyy   CxyCyx;
and (as above) the second subscript denotes partial
derivative. When the two interaction neighbourhoods
are the same, Rx ¼ Ry ¼ R, condition (A5) becomes
aR2 þ bR þ c . 0; ðA7Þ
where b ¼ bx þ by.
REFERENCES
Axelrod, R., Hammond, R. A. & Grafen, A. 2004 Altruism
via kin-selection strategies that rely on arbitrary tags
with which they coevolve. Evolution 58, 1833–1838.
Brown, S. P. & Johnstone, R. A. 2001 Cooperation in the
dark: signalling and collective action in quorum-sensing
bacteria. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 268, 961–965. (doi:10.
1098/rspb.2001.1609)
Brown, S. P., Hochberg, M. E. & Grenfell, B. T. 2002 Does
multiple infection select for raised virulence? Trends
Microbiol. 10, 401–405. (doi:10.1016/S0966-842X(02)
02413-7)
Brown, S. P., Inglis, R. F. & Taddei, F. 2009 Evolutionary
ecology of microbial wars: within-host competition and
(incidental) virulence. Evol. Appl. 2, 32–39. (doi:10.
1111/j.1752-4571.2008.00059.x)
Brown, S. P., West, S. A., Diggle, S. P. & Grifﬁn, A. S.
In press. Social evolution in microorganisms and a
Social evolution in multiple dimensions S. P. Brown & P. D. Taylor 421
Proc. R. Soc. B (2010)Trojan horse approach to medical intervention strategies.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B.
Christiansen, F. B. 1991 On conditions for evolutionary stab-
ility for a continuously varying character. Am. Nat. 138,
37–50. (doi:10.1086/285203)
Crosa, J. H., Mey, A. R. & Payne, S. M. 2004 Iron transport in
bacteria: molecular genetics, biochemistry and role in
pathogenicity and ecology. Washington, DC: ASM Press.
Dieckmann, U. & Law, R. 1996 The dynamical theory
of coevolution: a derivation from stochastic ecological
processes. J. Math. Biol. 34, 579–612. (doi:10.1007/
BF02409751)
Fehr, E. & Ga ¨chter, S. 2002 Altruistic punishment in
humans. Nature 415, 137–140. (doi:10.1038/415137a)
Frank, S. A. 1994 Kin selection and virulence in the evol-
ution of protocells and parasites. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B
258, 153–161. (doi:10.1098/rspb.1994.0156)
Frank, S. A. 1995 Mutual policing and repression of compe-
tition in the evolution of cooperative groups. Nature 377,
520–522. (doi:10.1038/377520a0)
Frank, S. A. 1998 Foundations of social evolution. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frank, S. A. 2003 Repression of competition and the
evolution of cooperation. Evolution 57, 693–705.
Gardner, A. & West, S. A. 2004 Cooperation and punish-
ment, especially in humans. Am. Nat. 164, 753–764.
(doi:10.1086/425623)
Gardner, A. & West, S. A. 2006 Demography, altruism, and
the beneﬁts of budding. J. Evol. Biol. 19, 1707–1716.
(doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01104.x)
Grifﬁn, A. S., West, S. A. & Buckling, A. 2004 Cooperation
and competition in pathogenic bacteria. Nature 430,
1024–1027. (doi:10.1038/nature02744)
Hacker, J. & Kaper, J. B. 2000 Pathogenicity islands and the
evolution of microbes. Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 54,
641–679. (doi:10.1146/annurev.micro.54.1.641)
Hamilton, W. D. 1964 The genetical evolution of social
behaviour, I and II. J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1–52. (doi:10.
1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)
Hamilton, W. D. 1970 Selﬁsh and spiteful behaviour in an
evolutionary model. Nature 228, 1218–1220. (doi:10.
1038/2281218a0)
Hamilton, W. D. & May, R. M. 1977 Dispersal in stable
habitats. Nature 269, 578–581. (doi:10.1038/269578a0)
Hardin, G. 1968 The tragedy of the commons. Science 162,
1243–1248.
Hochberg, M. E., Rankin, D. J. & Taborsky, M. 2008
The coevolution of cooperation and dispersal in social
groups and its implications for the emergence of multi-
cellularity. BMC Evol. Biol. 8, 238. (doi:10.1186/1471-
2148-8-238)
Jansen, V. A. A. & van Baalen, M. 2006 Altruism through
beard chromodynamics. Nature 440, 663–666. (doi:10.
1038/nature04387)
Le Galliard, J.-F., Ferriere, R. & Dieckmann, U. 2003 The
adaptive dynamics of altruism in spatially heterogenous
populations. Evolution 57, 1–17.
Le Galliard, J.-F., Ferriere, R. & Dieckmann, U. 2005 Adap-
tive evolution of social traits: origin, trajectories, and
correlations of altruism and mobility. Am. Nat. 165,
206–224. (doi:10.1086/427090)
Lehmann, L. & Feldman, M. W. 2008 War and the evolution
of belligerence and bravery. Proc. R. Soc. B 275,
2877–2885. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0842)
Lehmann, L. & Keller, L. 2006 The evolution of cooperation
and altruism: a general framework and a classiﬁcation of
models. J. Evol. Biol. 19, 1365–1376. (doi:10.1111/
j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x)
Leimar, O. In press. Multidimensional convergence stability
and the canonical adaptive dynamics. In Elements of
adaptive dynamics (eds U. Dieckmann & J. A. J. Metz).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lion, S. & van Baalen, M. 2008 Self-structuring in spatial
evolutionary ecology. Ecol. Lett. 11, 277–295. (doi:10.
1111/j.1461-0248.2007.01132.x)
Miller, M. B. & Bassler, B. L. 2001 Quorum sensing in
bacteria. Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 55, 165–199. (doi:10.
1146/annurev.micro.55.1.165)
Nogueira, T., Rankin, D. J., Touchon, M., Taddei, F.,
Brown, S. P. & Rocha, E. P. C. In press. Horizontal
gene transfer of the secretome drives the evolution of bac-
terial cooperation and virulence. Curr. Biol.
Otto, S. P. & Day, T. 2007 A biologist’s guide to mathematical
modeling in ecology and evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Perrin, N. & Lehmann, L. 2001 Is sociality driven by the
costs of dispersal or the beneﬁts of philopatry? A role
for kin-discrimination mechanisms. Am. Nat. 158,
471–483. (doi:10.1086/323114)
Pfeiffer, T. & Bonhoeffer, S. 2003 An evolutionary scenario
for the transition to undifferentiated multicellularity.
PNAS 100, 1095–1198. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0335420100)
Platt, T. G. & Bever, J. D. 2009 Kin competition and kin
cooperation. Trends Ecol. Evol. 24, 370–377. (doi:10.
1016/j.tree.2009.02.009)
Rousset, F. 2004 Genetic structure and selection in subdivided
populations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rousset, F. & Billiard, S. 2000 A theoretical basis for
measures of kin selection in subdivided populations:
ﬁnite populations and localized dispersal. J. Evol. Biol.
13, 814–825. (doi:10.1046/j.1420-9101.2000.00219.x)
Rousset, F. & Roze, D. 2007 Constraints on the origin and
maintenance of genetic kin recognition. Evolution 61,
2320–2330. (doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00191.x)
Roze, D. & Rousset, F. 2008 Multilocus models in the inﬁ-
nite island model of population structure. Theor. Popul.
Biol 73, 529–542. (doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2008.03.002)
Sachs, J. L., Mueller, U. G., Wilcox, T. P. & Bull, J. J. 2004
The evolution of cooperation. Q. Rev. Biol. 79, 136–160.
Sober, E. & Wilson, D. S. 1998 Unto others: the evolution and
psychology of unselﬁsh behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Taylor, P. D. 1992 Altruism in viscous populations: an inclus-
ive ﬁtness model. Evol. Ecol. 6, 352–356. (doi:10.1007/
BF02270971)
Taylor, P. D. & Frank, S. 1996 How to make a kin selection
argument. J. Theor. Biol. 180, 27–37. (doi:10.1006/jtbi.
1996.0075)
Taylor, P. D., Day, T. & Wild, G. 2007 From inclusive ﬁtness
to ﬁxation probability in homogeneous structured popu-
lations. J. Theor. Biol. 249, 101–110. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.
2007.07.006)
Wenseleers, T. & Ratnieks, F. L. W. 2006 Enforced altruism
in insect societies. Nature 444, 50. (doi:10.1038/444050a)
Wenseleers, T., Hart & Ratnieks, F. L. W. 2004 When resist-
ance is useless: policing and the evolution of reproductive
acquiescence in insect societies. Am. Nat. 164,
E154–E167. (doi:10.1086/425223)
Wenseleers, T., Gardner, A. & Foster, K. R. In press. Social
evolution theory: a review of methods and approaches.
In Social behaviour: genes, ecology and evolution (eds
T. Sze ´kely, J. Komdeur & A. J. Moore). Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
West, S. A., Pen, I. & Grifﬁn, A. S. 2002 Cooperation and
competition between relatives. Science 296, 72–75.
(doi:10.1126/science.1065507)
West, S. A., Grifﬁn, A. S. & Gardner, A. 2007 Social seman-
tics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity
and group selection. J. Evol. Biol. 20, 415–432. (doi:10.
1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01258.x)
422 S. P. Brown & P. D. Taylor Social evolution in multiple dimensions
Proc. R. Soc. B (2010)